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To efficiently manage information security, firms typically outsource part of their security functions 
to a managed security service provider (MSSP) under a variety of contractual arrangements. Based 
on this practice, we study a business setting in which the management of security outsourcing 
depends on the security efforts of both the MSSP and its clients, taking into account that their 
allocation of efforts can change during the contract horizon. Since their efforts are private to each 
other, a double moral hazard (DMH) problem can arise with the use of bilateral refund contracts, 
which have been widely adopted in the MSSP industry. Moreover, both the high probability of 
undirected attacks and system interdependency can exacerbate the DMH problem. We propose two 
new types of contracts to solve this problem. One is a monitoring contract, in which a cyberinsurance 
firm monitors the security efforts of the MSSP and its clients. The other is a liability contract, in 
which both parties take full liability for breaches through rewarding clients who are well protected 
and penalizing clients who end up being breached by hackers. Our findings show that monitoring 
contracts can only solve the DMH problem when variable monitoring costs are negligible. Liability 
contracts can also solve the DMH problem and are worth implementing when an MSSP encounters 
(1) a high probability of undirected attack, (2) high system interdependency, (3) a long contract 
horizon, or (4) when both parties have nearly equal responsibility over the course of the contract 
horizon. We also compare the proposed contracts in two additional settings: when the MSSP has a 
spillover effect and when the MSSP serves three or more clients. 
Keywords: Information Security Outsourcing, Double Moral Hazard, Cyber-Insurance, Liability 
Contract 
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1 Introduction 
The frequent occurrence of cyberattacks and the 
increasing sophistication of technologies for 
information security have pushed many firms to 
outsource security protection to managed security 
service providers (MSSPs). The global managed 
security service market is expected to reach $47.65 
billion by 2023 (MarketsandMarkets, 2018), and a 
recent survey (pwc, 2017) shows that 62% of 
respondents use an MSSP to operate and enhance their 
cybersecurity programs.  
Firms usually outsource only part of their security 
activities to an MSSP for the following reasons. First, 
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outsourcing core information systems can lead to 
potential theft of proprietary information since the 
MSSP could misappropriate the information and sell it 
to competitors (Clemons & Aron, 2004). Second, the 
practice of outsourcing generally allows firms to focus 
on efficiently using their resources while paying an 
MSSP to perform functions they are less adept at (Rowe, 
2007). For instance, firms often outsource prevention 
and detection functions to an MSSP and operate basic 
security fundamentals such as updating and employee 
education in-house (Vuorinen and Tetri 2012). 
Therefore, effective management of information 
security requires both the MSSP and its clients to 
cooperate under various contractual arrangements. 
In practice, bilateral refund contracts (BRCs) have been 
widely adopted in the MSSP industry. BRCs determine 
the service fees that clients  pay to an MSSP and the 
compensation that an MSSP must pay to clients if a 
breach occurs (Bryson, 2000). Like other outsourcing 
relationships, a double moral hazard (DMH) problem 
can arise in BRC contexts (Cooper & Ross, 1985) 
because the security quality depends on the security 
efforts of both the MSSP and its client, and neither party 
can verify how much effort the other party is devoting 
to this issue. For instance, in 2004, a payment processing 
company called CardSystems (CS) hired an MSSP 
named Savvis to assess and certify its compliance with 
credit card security regulations and CS developed its 
own security operations. One year later, CS suffered a 
data breach and more than 40 million credit card records 
were compromised (Zetter, 2009). Following the event, 
CS sued Savvis for not providing sufficient vulnerability 
assessment and compliance services, while Savvis sued 
CS for not investing enough in information security.  
Unlike other types of outsourcing relationships, two 
distinctive characteristics of security outsourcing— 
hacker behavior, and system interdependency—have 
significant effects on contractual arrangements. 
Hacker behavior is usually segregated into two 
categories, undirected attacks and direct attacks,  based 
on whether attacks are autonomous over the network 
(undirected attack) or have a specific target (direct 
attack) (Casey, 2003). Viruses, worms, and spam email 
are common undirected attacks, whereas denial of 
service, website defacement, and the purposeful 
penetration into a bank’s system are typical direct 
attacks. Compared to direct attacks, undirected attacks 
may be more massive and pervasive but are easier to 
address because they have a stable frequency and are 
prevented by MSSPs on a daily basis (pwc, 2017). 
System interdependency often emerges when clients’ 
systems are interdependent since security technologies 
adopted by an MSSP have similar vulnerabilities. 
Consequently, when hackers breach such 
vulnerabilities, a simultaneous breach may occur with 
other clients (Hui et al., 2012). System 
interdependency is more serious in the case of 
undirected attacks since undirected attacks make it 
easier to infect interconnected systems. For example, 
in 2010, the email provider Silverpop was breached by 
spammers. As an MSSP, Silverpop had adopted 
similar technologies with all its clients and many of its 
clients suffered serious data breaches (Charette, 2010).  
Based on the above, we study security outsourcing 
management in a collaborative and dynamic setting. 
The collaboration between an MSSP and its clients is 
necessarily dynamic because the information security 
landscape is highly fluid and dynamic (Mookerjee et 
al., 2011). In our study, once an MSSP and its client 
sign a contract, they both need to devote efforts to 
security, and their security efforts may change, 
requiring interaction with each other throughout the 
contract duration. We demonstrate that BRCs can 
induce the DMH problem, which becomes severe 
when an MSSP faces either a high attack probability or 
high system interdependency. To address the DMH 
problem, we propose two new contract types according 
to project control (i.e., behavior control and outcome 
control) (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). We analyze 
each  contract type by answering the following four 
questions: (1) Can the proposed contract solve the 
DMH problem? (2) What is the operating mechanism 
underlying the proposed contract? (3) Is it easy to 
evaluate the compensation in the proposed contract 
following a breach? (4) Is the proposed contract worth 
implementing?  
Based on behavior control, we propose the monitoring 
contract, in which the security efforts of both parties 
are monitored by a third-party agent that we refer to as 
the cyberinsurance firm. Monitoring efforts can 
eliminate information asymmetry (Hölmstrom, 1979); 
thus, we find that the monitoring contracts can solve 
the DMH problem when the variable monitoring costs 
are negligible. However, it is not easy to implement 
monitoring contracts since the compensation is 
affected by many factors. Based on outcome control, 
we propose the liability contract, in which the MSSP 
rewards clients who are well protected and penalizes 
clients who end up being breached by hackers. We find 
that the liability contract can also solve the DMH 
problem and is easy to implement. The operating 
mechanism of the liability contract is based on both the 
MSSP and clients being fully liable for security loss, 
including direct loss and indirect loss caused by system 
interdependency.  
We compare the three contract types: the bilateral 
refund contract, the monitoring contract, and the 
liability contract. Our analysis indicates that the 
MSSP’s effort is U-shaped in terms of system 
interdependency, whereas the client’s effort is 
inversely U-shaped with BRCs because of the  trade-
off between security risk and investment risk. 
However, intensified system interdependency causes 
both parties to increase their respective security efforts 
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in the context of monitoring and liability contracts. 
Monitoring contracts are worth implementing when 
the fixed monitoring costs are low, while liability 
contracts are worth implementing when the MSSP 
faces high attack probabilities or high system 
interdependency, when the contract horizon is long, or 
when both parties have nearly equal responsibility. 
Finally, we extend our model to show that the two new 
contract types we propose are appropriate when the 
MSSP’s efforts have a spillover effect on clients or 
when the MSSP serves three or more clients. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 
3 introduces the model and derives the benchmark 
efforts. Section 4 presents the analysis of the three 
contract types—the bilateral refund contract, the 
monitoring contract, and the liability contract. Section 
5 compares the three contracts, and Section 6 extends 
the basic model. Managerial implications are discussed 
in Section 7.  
2 Literature Review 
Since security outsourcing as a strategy to manage 
information security is a recent development, the 
extant research devoted to this topic is limited. In their 
seminal paper, Ding et al. (2005) examine the optimal 
contract characteristics of an MSSP by considering 
moral hazard problems and reputation effects. Hui et 
al. (2012) examine how system interdependency 
would interact with a mandatory security requirement 
to affect the equilibrium behaviors of an MSSP and its 
clients. Zhao et al. (2013) examine three alternative 
risk management approaches and show that an MSSP 
serving multiple firms can internalize the externality of 
security investments. Cezar et al. (2014) classify the 
nature of the security function into two categories and 
propose a new contract to enhance the advantages 
offered by the complementarity between prevention 
and detection functions. Cezar et al. (2017) also 
explain firms’ decisions to outsource security based on 
interdependent risks and competitive externalities. 
These studies focus on the MSSP’s effort only and do 
not consider clients’ involvement and thus do not 
account for the client-side moral hazard problem 
associated with BRCs. However, since the outsourcing 
part of security activities is common in practice, the 
resulting DMH problem is a serious issue that needs to 
be considered.  
Research in many domains has addressed the DMH 
problem that arises when two involved parties are not 
contractible. For example, in economics, Cooper and 
Ross (1985) discuss the optimal product warranty 
contract in the presence of double moral hazard and 
show that bilateral contracts do not lead to first-best 
outcomes. In operations management, Demirezen et al. 
(2016) study the relationship between clients and 
vendors in value co-creation environments and 
highlight the circumstances under which double moral 
hazard decreases the client’s overall value. In the 
information systems domain, Jayanth et al. (2011) 
study the double moral hazard problem that arises in 
the requirements assessment of software development 
and find that increasing the effectiveness of the 
feedback process for clients can mitigate the DMH 
problem. 
Although the DMH problem has been widely 
discussed in the above domains, to the best of our 
knowledge, Lee et al. (2013) is the only other paper 
that discusses the DMH problem in the context of 
security outsourcing. However, our research differs 
from theirs in terms of three aspects: utility, variability, 
and operability. First, Lee et al. (2013) propose a new 
contract type to solve the DMH problem but do not 
consider the contract’s utility. By contrast, we not only 
consider a variety of contractual arrangements that 
could be implemented to solve the DMH problem, but 
also consider hacker behavior and compare the utility 
of two new contract types and offer guidance to 
security participants seeking the most beneficial type 
of contract. Second, Lee et al. (2013) develop a lump-
sum, single-shot model, whereas we consider a 
dynamic model. If certain factors vary—for example, 
the MSSP enhances its ability by deploying newer 
protection technology while the contract is valid, the 
change is not incorporated into either party’s updated 
decisions in a static model. Our paper accounts for 
variability in effort since the security landscape 
continues to be highly fluid and dynamic (Mookerjee 
et al., 2011). Third, the contract terms proposed by Lee 
et al. (2013) depend on security externality, and both 
parties’ security efforts determine security externality. 
However, a basic assumption of DMH is that neither 
party understands the other’s security effort. Thus, the 
contract proposed by Lee et al. (2013) is challenging 
and difficult to implement. In contrast, the 
compensation coefficient proposed in this paper 
depends only on security interdependency, which can 
be estimated using past breach data. Thus, the new 
contract types proposed in this paper are operable.  
Prior research  has examined insurance as a risk 
management tool (Georges, 2013). For example, Ogut 
et al. (2005) use an economic model to discuss the 
impact of system interdependency on firms’ security 
investments and insurance coverage. They find that 
system interdependency reduces firms’ incentives to 
invest in security. Srinidhi et al. (2015) show that 
cyberinsurance reduces managers’ overinvestment in 
specific security-enhancing assets. Prior literature 
treats cyberinsurance as a supplementary strategy of 
security investments. In contrast, we segregate the 
insurance function of an MSSP to a cyberinsurance 
firm that can monitor and verify the security efforts of 
both an MSSP and its clients. 
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3 The Model 
We consider an MSSP that provides some security 
functions to two homogeneous clients and is faced with 
the challenge of determining the optimal outsourcing 
contract. The MSSP can choose from three types of 
contract: the bilateral refund contract, the monitoring 
contract, or the liability contract. Irrespective of which 
contract type is chosen, both the MSSP and clients need 
to exert respective security efforts to improve security 
quality in a dynamic environment. We model the 
contracting problem as a differential game in which both 
parties are risk-neutral, and the total time horizon of the 
contract is denoted by 𝑇.  
We denote the security effort levels of the MSSP and 
client 𝑖  at time 𝑡  by 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)  and 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) , respectively.
1 
Gartner reports that a majority of initial security efforts 
involve basic infrastructure technologies (“keeping bad 
guys out” technologies) such as firewalls and antivirus 
with stable costs, and the subsequent focus of the effort 
shifts to “letting good guys in” technologies such as 
authentication and access management, which require 
more investment in configuration and management 
(Wheatman et al., 2005, Gupta and Zhdanov, 2012). 
Thus, we assume that both parties’ security effort costs 
follow increasing convex functions, as outlined in the 
following assumption:2  
Assumption 1: Both the MSSP’s and client’s security 









2 (𝑡) , respectively, 
where 𝐶 is a cost coefficient.  
As discussed above, the improvement in the security 
quality of client 𝑖 is a consequence of the collaborative 
work between the MSSP and client 𝑖. In Varian (2004), 
system reliability is defined in the context of three 
prototypical cases: the total-effort case, the minimum 
effort case, and the maximum effort case. This paper 
follows most studies (such as Yue et al., 2007) in that we 
assume that client i’s security quality depends on the total 
efforts exerted by both parties and that these efforts allow 
improvements in security quality to accumulate over time 
 
1 The subscripts F , M , and R  represent the client, the MSSP, 
and the cyberinsurance firm, respectively, and the subscript i and 
3-i represent the sequence of clients, where i=1,2. 
2 To achieve analytical tractability, we assume that the cost of 
security effort follows a quadratic function, which is sufficient 
to capture the feature of the cost function. A more general effort 
cost function with an increasing convex function turns out to be 
analytically intractable.  
3 In the following analysis, the maximum of security quality 










    , thus 











 holds to ensure 1q  . 
(Srinidhi et al., 2015). Thus, we state the following 
assumption:  
Assumption 2: Client i’s instantaneous increase in 
security quality is ?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)) , 
where 𝛼 (𝛽) is the output sensitivity of client 𝑖 (the 
MSSP). Client 𝑖 has the initial quality 𝑞0. 
The positive parameter 𝜀  needs to be sufficiently small 
such that client 𝑖′𝑠  security quality 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)  always lies 
between 0 and 1.3 The above assumption implies that the 
instantaneous increase in security quality is a sum of each 
party’s instantaneous effort multiplied by their respective 
output sensitivity. A party that has a higher output 
sensitivity implies that it can improve security quality 
more effectively. Thus, it is rational for both parties to 
align respective responsibility for the output of security 
quality according to their output sensitivities. Therefore, 
the output sensitivities 𝛼  and 𝛽 , can also represent 
respective responsibility levels for the output of security 
quality. Output sensitivities are inherently difficult to 
determine and two methods are usually adopted to 
estimate them in practice. One involves using data from 
other business cases, including contracts between the 
MSSP and other industry peers; the other is evaluated by 
a third party such as an industry association, with the help 
of investment evaluation techniques such as return on 
investment (Dickson, 2018). Furthermore, a client has the 
initial security quality of 𝑞0 when neither an MSSP nor 
the client exerts security efforts. 
A client’s system’s breach probability depends on both 
the system’s security quality and the probability of a 
hacker’s attack on the system. As noted above, compared 
to strategic attacks, undirected attacks may be more 
pervasive but they have a stable frequency and are 
prevented by MSSPs on a daily basis. Thus, this study 
focuses on undirected attacks and assumes that the 
probability of an undirected attack on a client is a constant 
𝑎, which lies between 0 and 1.4 Therefore, the successful 
breach probability 𝑝𝑖(𝑡)  of client 𝑖  at time 𝑡  is 𝑎(1 −
𝑞𝑖(𝑡)). 
A client will obtain an increasing nonnegative utility 
𝑉(𝑡) over time if no security breaches occur during the 
contract period; we assume the client’s initial utility is 
Otherwise, the security loss is catastrophic and both the MSSP 
and clients will always choose the highest level of security 
quality, i.e., 1q = . This case is not interesting and thus we 
exclude it from the analysis.   
4 Since undirected attacks usually occur with a stable frequency 
and the period of information security outsourcing contract is 
usually not long, we assume the probability of undirected attack 
is a constant during the contract period. A more general model 
that the probability of undirected attack is a stochastic variable 
turns out to be analytically intractable. 
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zero. 5  An information system, such as a customer 
relationship management system, should be more 
valuable to firms over time if it continues to remain 
secure. When breached, a client would incur a direct 
loss, which we refer to as security loss 𝐿 . The loss 
includes tangible costs such as revenue losses from the 
disruption of services and intangible costs such as 
reputation and consumer losses.  
Beyond direct security losses to client 𝑖, other clients 
may also suffer indirect losses caused by system 
interdependency. As noted above, system 
interdependency is caused when multiple clients adopt 
similar security technologies provided by the MSSP, 
resulting in hackers who are able to exploit the common 
vulnerability of the technology to attack all its clients. 
This scenario usually appears when an MSSP suffers 
undirected attacks, as shown in the real-world case of 
Silverpop, which was breached by spammers. Thus, we 
make the following assumption: 
Assumption 3: If one client is compromised, the client 
incurs a loss of 𝐿 and the other client incurs a loss of 
𝜆𝐿, where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of system 
interdependency and is determined by past breaches. 
Furthermore, the liability for a breach cannot be 
easily assigned to one party only. 
The term 𝜆 that lies between 0 and 1 implies that the 
loss caused by a direct breach is more than that caused 
by system interdependency. The Cardsystems case 
demonstrates that the liability for a breach cannot be 
easily assigned to one party only. Therefore, it is very 
hard to determine the degree of system 
interdependency after a breach occurs. In practice, 𝜆 
can be estimated using data from past breaches.6  
The game between the MSSP and clients is a 
Stackelberg game, where the MSSP is the principal 
and includes two stages. In Stage 1, the MSSP offers a 
contract (𝑓𝑖, 𝜙𝑖) to client 𝑖. Client 𝑖 pays a service fee 
𝑓𝑖 to the MSSP, and the MSSP compensates the client 
with 𝜙𝑖𝐿  if the client suffers a breach, with 𝜙𝑖 
representing the compensation coefficient. In practice, 
the compensation is based on either the service fee or 
security loss. For example, the compensation that 
Verizon Business pays its clients depends on either the 
service fee or the extent of security loss.7 This paper 
follows prior literature (e.g. Hui et al., 2012) in 
assuming that compensation depends on the extent of 
security loss. In addition, the MSSP needs to 
compensate client j with 𝜆𝜙𝑗𝐿  if client j suffers an 
indirect loss caused by system interdependency. In 
Stage 2, clients can accept or reject the contract. If 
client 𝑖  rejects the contract, client i obtains the 
reservation utility ?̱?𝐹 , and the MSSP obtains the 
reservation utility ?̱?𝑀.
8 If client 𝑖 accepts the contract, 
the MSSP exerts 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡), and client 𝑖 exerts 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) to 
improve client i’s security quality. Table 1 contains a 
list of the key notations used in the paper.
 
Table 1. Main Model Notations 
Notations Definition Variable types 
𝑇 Length of contract horizon  
𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) (𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡)) The MSSP’s (client i’s) security effort at time 𝑡 Control variable 
𝛼 (𝛽) Output sensitivity of the client (the MSSP)  
𝑞𝑖(𝑡) Client i’s security quality at time 𝑡 State variable 
𝑎 Probability of undirected attack on a client’s system  
𝐿 Security loss  
𝜆 System interdependency  
𝑓𝑖 Service fee Decision variable 
𝜙𝑖 Compensation coefficient under the BRC Decision variable 
 
5 Since the nonnegative utility has no effect on our main 
results, we assume that both client’s utility is same, and their 
initial utility is zero, i.e., 
3( ) ( ) ( )i iV t V t V t−= =  and 
3(0) (0) 0i iV V −= = , where 1,2i = . If relaxing this assumption, 
we just need to replace ( )V T  with ( ) (0)i iV T V− . 
6 We measure the degree of system interdependency from 
past breaches data since it is hard to measure the similarity 
degree of security technologies. For example, there are two 
sets of past breach data, one is where a client suffers an 
indirect loss of 1
2
L  due to system interdependency (that is, 
1
2
= ), the other is where the client suffers nothing when the 
other client incurs a breach (that is, 0= ). When signing 
the contract, the MSSP will offer the contract in which the 
system interdependency is the average of the past two 
breaches (that is, 1
4
= ). Since a client may suffer many 
undirected attacks during the contract horizon and the actual 
value of system interdependency is difficult to determine, we 
can use the average of system interdependency to represent 
its actual value. 
 
7  http://www.verizonenterprise.com/terms/us/products/security/ 
intrusion/ 
8 Reservation utility means the minimum level of utility that 
must be guaranteed by a contract to make it acceptable to all 
contract participants. 
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3.1 Benchmark Case 
We first analyze the benchmark case where we assume 
that there is no moral hazard occurrence because both 
the MSSP and the clients operate as one entity or as a 
single firm. The objective in this case is to maximize 
the summation of the expected payoffs of an MSSP and 
both clients. Through comparison with the benchmark 
case, we can compare the performance of the three 
contracts. The benchmark payoff and constraints can 
be expressed as follows: 
2
2 2
0( ), ( )
1
1 1




e t e t
i
SW V T p t L Ce t Ce t dt
=
 





0( ), ( )
1
1 1




e t e t
i
SW V T p t L Ce t Ce t dt
=
 
= − + + + 
 
              (1) 
. .  ( ) ( ( ) ( )),  1,2i Fi Mis t q t e t e t i= + =                         (2) 
( ) 0,  ( ) 0,  1,2Fi Mie t e t i  =             (3) 
2M FSW U U +                
(4) 
where 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)). The objective function in 
Equation (1) is to maximize the total social welfare, 
which includes both clients’ nonnegative utilities 
(𝑉(𝑇)), the direct and indirect security loss (𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 +








2 (𝑡)). The constraint represented in Equation (2) 
describes how improvements in security quality 
accumulate over time. The constraint represented in 
Equation (3) states that neither party’s security effort 
can be negative. The constraint represented as 
Equation (4) indicates that both parties productively 
collaborate only if they can generate a combined value 
of social welfare that is larger than their total 
reservation utilities. The benchmark efforts can be 
expressed as follows: 
Lemma 1: The benchmark security efforts of the client 










All proofs are in Appendix A. Lemma 1 indicates that 
both parties’ benchmark efforts depend only on their 
own output sensitivities and have nothing to do with 
the other party’s output sensitivity. This is because the 
benchmark setting treats both parties as a single firm, 
thereby eliminating moral hazard. As a result, both 
parties perform their respective duties and exert efforts 
in strict accordance with their respective output 
sensitivities. 
4 Contractual Arrangements 
This section analyzes the three contracts: the bilateral 
refund contract, the monitoring contract, and the 
liability contract, respectively. 
4.1 Bilateral Refund Contract 
The basic assumption of the benchmark case is to treat 
an MSSP and its clients as if they were aligned as a 
single firm, in which case each party’s efforts could be 
verified by the other. However, the goal of both parties 
is to maximize their own expected benefits under the 
BRC; thus, their effort levels are private and cannot be 
reciprocally verified. The expected payoffs for both 
parties under the BRC are as follows: 
2
2
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2
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M F F M M i i i i Mi
i
U e t e t e t e t f p t L Ce t dt−
=
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 
= − + − + − 
 
     (6) 
where 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2 . An MSSP’s 
expected payoff under the BRC includes the service 
fee received from the client (𝑓𝑖), the compensation paid 





2 (𝑡) ). Similarly, client i’s expected payoff 
includes its nonnegative utility ( 𝑉(𝑇) ), direct and 
indirect loss ( (𝑝𝑖(𝑡) + 𝜆𝑝3−𝑖(𝑡))𝐿 ), the MSSP’s 





2 (𝑡)). Following the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium concept (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991), we 
use backward induction to solve the problem. In Stage 
2, both parties determine optimal security efforts by 
maximizing their own expected payoffs. We use 
?̂?𝑀𝑖(𝑡) and ?̂?𝐹𝑖(𝑡) to represent the MSSP’s and client 
i’s subgame perfect Nash equilibrium efforts. The 
problem faced by the MSSP in Stage 1 is presented in 
the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A. We give the 
optimal operating mechanism under the BRC directly: 
Lemma 2: Under the bilateral refund contract, the 











The MSSP exerts effort ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1+𝜆)(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2−𝜆𝛼2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2+𝛼2)
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Hereafter, we refer to ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) and ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) as the MSSP’s 
and the client’s BRC efforts, respectively. We find that  
?̂?𝑀(𝑡) < 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡)  and ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) < 𝑒𝐹
∗(𝑡) , i.e., both parties’ 
BRC efforts are always weaker than their own 
benchmark efforts. Thus, a DMH problem arises under 
the BRC, leading to inefficiency in security efforts 
stemming from the free-rider problem (Roels et al., 
2010). The BRC induces the DMH problem because  
compensation has different roles for incentivizing both 
parties, i.e., compensation simultaneously punishes the 
MSSP and rewards clients. If 𝜙𝑖 = 1, ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡), 
and if 𝜙𝑖 = −𝜆, ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑒𝐹
∗(𝑡), then the party that takes 
full liability for the breach will exert the benchmark 
effort. Since the compensation coefficient lies between 
0 and 1, the DMH problem always exists when 
executing BRCs.  
Proposition 1: In the bilateral refund contract: (a) The 
DMH problem for one party will first become worse 
and will then be alleviated as its own output 
sensitivity increases, and (b) The DMH problem for 
both parties will become worse as the system 
interdependency or attack probability increases. 
Proposition 1(a) shows that as one party’s output 
sensitivity increases, the gap between its own 
benchmark effort and the BRC effort first increases and 
then decreases. We find that both parties’ DMH 
problems are the worst when 𝛼 = 𝛽(1 + 𝜆), i.e., when 
the output sensitivity of the MSSP is nearly equal to that 
of the client. In this case, both parties have nearly equal 
responsibility for improving security quality, and thus 
the most severe DMH problem arises. However, when 
one party takes on most of the responsibility, its BRC 
effort is nearly equal to its benchmark effort. Therefore, 
one party’s BRC effort is effective when it retains most 
of the responsibility in the collaboration and is 
ineffective when both parties assume nearly equal 
responsibility. 
Proposition 1(b) indicates that as the system 
interdependency increases, the gap between both 
parties’ benchmark efforts and BRC efforts increases. 
Since the benchmark case treats the MSSP and clients 
as a single firm, both parties completely internalize the 
system interdependency. However, under the BRC, the 
MSSP internalizes the system interdependency directly 
and incompletely since its expected payoff is directly 
affected by the system interdependency. In contrast, the 
client internalizes the system interdependency indirectly 
and incompletely through the compensation offered by 
the MSSP. Thus, the DMH problem for both parties will 
become worse as the system interdependency increases. 
Proposition 1(b) also shows that the gap between one 
party’s benchmark effort and BRC effort increases with 
the probability of undirected attacks. As discussed 
above, in the benchmark setting, the MSSP and clients 
perform their respective duties and jointly exert efforts 
commensurate with the attack probability. However, 
since both parties’ goal is to maximize their own 
expected payoffs under the BRC, although the effort 
under the BRC increases with the attack probability, the 
rate of increase of the benchmark effort also becomes 
greater. As a result, both parties’ DMH problem will 
become worse as the probability of undirected attacks 
increases. 
4.2 The Monitoring Contract 
Section 4.1 shows that both the MSSP and its clients 
suffer a DMH problem under the BRC. We thus propose 
two new contract types—the monitoring contract and 
the liability contract—to address the DMH problem 
according to the project control types. Project control is 
an effective contract design mechanism that integrates 
the respective capabilities of participants (Kirsch, 1997). 
Two types of controls have been commonly considered 
by the principal, i.e., behavior control and outcome 
control (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003).  
In terms of behavior control, the principal can influence 
the project process by monitoring an agent’s behaviors 
and rewarding or penalizing the agent based on the level 
of effort (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). As one form 
of behavior control, monitoring security efforts can 
eliminate information asymmetry between the MSSP 
and clients and solve the DMH problem. In effect, 
monitoring effort is sometimes necessary because 
information security may seem harmless or irrelevant 
when firms do not face imminent malicious attacks 
(Feng, et al. 2019). Although an MSSP can monitor 
clients’ efforts, since it is difficult for the MSSP to verify 
them, legal disputes between the MSSP and its clients 
may arise, as evidenced by the CardSystems/Savvis 
case. Thus, monitoring and verification processes might 
be better managed by a third party. In practice, 
cyberinsurance (CI) firms  are actively used as third-
party agents to mitigate firms’ exposure to financial 
distress resulting from security breaches (Srinidhi et al., 
2015). CI firms are considered an effective incentive 
mechanism to enforce rational economic behavior 
across security stakeholders. CI firms can monitor both 
parties’ security efforts with the help of tools such as 
information technologies (IT), forensic audits, and 
regular meetings (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). The 
2015 value of the global standalone cyberinsurance 
market has been estimated at $1.7 billion in annual gross 
written premiums (Aon Inpoint, 2017).  
As the cyberinsurance market grows, the insurance 
function of the MSSP can be increasingly delegated to a 
third-party insurer, who can monitor and verify the 
efforts of both the MSSP and its clients. In practice, 
before issuing insurance policies, CI firms often 
formally audit clients to ensure that clients have 
appropriate security capabilities enabling them to take 
proper actions to protect themselves (Zhao et al., 2013). 
Thus, we assume that CI firms can monitor and regulate 
the efforts of both parties through insurance policies. 










Figure 1. The Relationship between the Cyberinsurance Firm, the MSSP, and Clients 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the timing of events is as 
follows: (1) Clients pay an insurance premium FI  to 
the CI firm, and the CI firm offers a service fee MI  to 
the MSSP for providing security services to its clients. 
(2) The insurance policy stipulates that both the MSSP 
and its clients must make efforts to improve security. 
(3) If a client experiences a breach, the CI firm pays 
compensation Fs L  to the client and charges the MSSP 
a penalty Ms L , where Fs  and Ms  are the 
compensation coefficient and penalty coefficient, 
respectively. Like in a BRC, the CI firm pays 
compensation Fs L  to the client and charges the 
MSSP a penalty Ms L  if a client suffers an indirect 
loss caused by system interdependency. 
Despite the benefits, monitoring security efforts incurs 
some fixed and variable costs for the CI firm. As 
mentioned above, monitoring security efforts requires 
the deployment of tools such as IT, which imposes 
fixed costs on the CI firm. The variable costs increase 
with the agent’s effort since more effort requires more 
monitoring costs (Demirezen et al., 2016). Thus, we 
make the following assumption:9:  
Assumption 4: When monitoring the MSSP and client 
i’s security effort, the cyberinsurance firm incurs a 








2 (𝑡)  based on the MSSP’s and client i’s 
security efforts, where 𝐶𝑅 is the cost multiplier for 
monitoring security efforts. 
 
9 The relationship between the monitoring cost and security 
effort may be ambiguous in practice. To make our model 
more generalizable, we test other functional forms of the 
monitoring costs such as  ( ) ( ))Ri R Fi R MiF C e t C e t+ +  and 






e t e t
+ + . The analysis shows that adjusting the 
Monitoring security efforts implies that the CI firm can 
set the MSSP and clients’ security efforts at levels that 
maximize the CI firm’s own excepted payoff. We use 
?̄?𝑀(𝑡)  and ?̄?𝐹(𝑡)  to represent such levels of the 
MSSP’s and client i’s security efforts in Stage 2. The 
problem faced by the CI firm in Stage 1 is presented in 
the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix A.  
We now analyze the proposed monitoring contract by 
answering the following four questions: (1) Can the 
proposed contract solve the DMH problem? (2) What 
is the operating mechanism underlying the proposed 
contract? (3) Is it easy to evaluate the compensation in 
the proposed contract following a breach? (4) Is the 
proposed contract worth implementing? The following 
lemma answers the first and second questions: 
Lemma 3: In equilibrium, the CI firm sets insurance 
premium and compensation to the client such that 
𝐼𝐹
∗ + (1 − 𝑠𝐹
∗ )((1 − 𝑞0)(1 + 𝜆)𝑎𝐿𝑇 −
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2(1+𝜆)2𝑇3(𝛼2+𝛽2)
3(𝐶+𝐶𝑅)
) = 𝑉(𝑇) − ?̱?𝐹 −
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2(1+𝜆)2𝑇3𝛼2
6(𝐶+𝐶𝑅)




. Meanwhile, the CI Firm 
sets service fee and penalty to the MSSP such that 
2𝐼𝑀
∗ − 2𝑠𝑀
∗ ((1 − 𝑞0)(1 + 𝜆)𝑎𝐿𝑇 −
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2(1+𝜆)2𝑇3(𝛼2+𝛽2)
3(𝐶+𝐶𝑅)








Four scenarios may occur when the CI firm monitors 
security efforts: (1) both parties exert the required 
effort; (2) only the MSSP exerts the required effort; (3) 
functional form of the monitoring cost does not change our 
results qualitatively, but complicates the results stated in 
Lemma 3 and Section 4.2. For simplicity, we omit the 
analysis of other functional forms and adopt the monitoring 
cost as 2 21 ( ( ) ( ))
2
Ri R Fi MiF C e t e t+ +
. 
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only the client exerts the required effort; and (4) neither 
party exerts the required effort. Lemma 3 indicates that 
?̄?𝑀(𝑡) and ?̄?𝐹(𝑡) are the subgame perfect equilibrium 
in the game. The subgame perfect equilibrium implies 
that the solution provides credible threats so that no 
player can benefit from deviating from the announced 
strategy (Sorger, 1989). Therefore, only the first 
scenario will occur, i.e., both parties exerting the effort 
required by the CI firm. 
Based on Lemma 3, we find that when 𝐶𝑅 = 0 , 
?̄?𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡)  and ?̄?𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑒𝐹
∗(𝑡) . Thus, when the 
variable monitoring cost ( 𝐶𝑅 ) is negligible, both 
parties’ security efforts can achieve their respective 
benchmark efforts and the DMH problem can be 
solved. When 𝐶𝑅  is not negligible, the CI firm’s 
variable cost of monitoring security efforts prevents 
both parties from setting a high level of security effort, 
thus, neither party’s security effort reaches their 
respective benchmark efforts.  
We now answer the third question. Lemma 3 indicates 
that the compensation coefficient ( 𝑠𝐹
∗ ) and penalty 
coefficient (𝑠𝑀
∗ ) are decided by many parameters such 
as output sensitivity, system interdependency, attack 
probability, and the length of the contract horizon. Thus, 
the monitoring contract is challenging to implement and 
the CI firm must evaluate all these parameters before 
implementing the monitoring contract.  
In conclusion, the proposed monitoring contract has 
two shortcomings. First, the monitoring contract can 
solve the DMH problem only when the variable 
monitoring cost is negligible. Second, it is challenging 
to evaluate the appropriate compensation and penalty 
in the case of a breach. Thus, both the high monitoring 
costs and the complex monitoring process may 
potentially impede the implementation of the proposed 
contract. An MSSP should offer an easily 
implementable contract that can solve the DMH 
problem without any constraints. We next turn our 
attention to the liability contract, which has the 
capacity to solve the problems associated with the 
other contract type. 
4.3 The Liability Contract 
In this section, we consider the liability contract, which 
is based on outcome control. In contrast to behavior 
control, outcome control mainly focuses on outsourcing 
engagement outputs and is indifferent to internal 
processes. The liability contract assumes that the MSSP 
compensates clients based on the outcome of security 
breaches, as described in the following assumption: 
Assumption 5: Under the liability contract, client 𝑖 
pays a fixed fee 𝑓𝑖 to the MSSP. A compensation 
combination 𝐷 = (𝑑𝑏𝑏 , 𝑑𝑏𝑛, 𝑑𝑛𝑏) will be returned 
by the MSSP to the client, where the MSSP 
compensates each client dbb  if both clients are 
breached, compensates the breached client dbn and 
the unbreached client 𝑑𝑛𝑏  if only one client is 
breached. Further, the MSSP incurs a fixed 
implementation cost 𝐶𝑉 to enforce the contract.  
Assumption 5 requires the MSSP to differentiate 
breached clients and unbreached clients. In practice, 
three reasons can explain why breach events are public 
information (Lee et al., 2013). First, many firms in the 
United States are legally required to disclose security 
breaches to the public. Second, social word-of-mouth 
can spread breach information to the public. Third, 
firms may suffer continuous losses when breached; 
thus, firms have incentives to disclose breaches to their 
MSSP in a timely manner. Based on Assumption 5, the 
expected respective payoffs for the MSSP and client 𝑖 
are as follows: 
1 2 1 2
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where 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2 . In the above 
Equations (7) and (8), 𝑝1(𝑡)𝑝2(𝑡)𝑑𝑏𝑏  represents the 
MSSP’s compensation to clients when both clients are 
breached, 𝑝1(𝑡)(1 − 𝑝2(𝑡))𝑑𝑏𝑛  represents the 
MSSP’s compensation to the breached client when 
only one client is breached and (1 − 𝑝1(𝑡))𝑝2(𝑡)𝑑𝑛𝑏 
represents the MSSP’s compensation to the 
unbreached client when only one client is breached. 
The problem faced by the MSSP in Stage 1 is presented 
in the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix A. 
The following lemma characterizes the proposed 
contract: 
Lemma 4: Under the liability contract, the MSSP sets 




and the compensation combination ?̃? =
(?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛, ?̃?𝑛𝑏) , where ?̃?𝑏𝑏 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏 =









Lemma 4 answers the first question, indicating that 
both the MSSP and the client have incentives to exert 
benchmark efforts under the liability contract; thus the 
liability contract can eliminate both parties’ DMH 
problem without any conditions. The following 
proposition answers the second question: 
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Proposition 2: In a liability contract, if both clients are 
breached, the MSSP compensates each client with  
(1 + 𝜆)𝐿 . If only one client is breached, the 
breached client compensates the MSSP with 𝜆𝐿 
and the MSSP rewards the unbreached client with  
(1 + 2𝜆)𝐿. 
Proposition 2 makes the operating mechanism behind 
the proposed contract clear. However, what we are 
interested in is how this operating mechanism can 
eliminate both parties’ DMH problem. We first 
analyze the client’s incentive. When client 𝑖  is 
breached, it incurs a loss 𝐿  and client 𝑗  incurs an 
indirect loss 𝜆𝐿 caused by the system interdependency. 
Under the BRC, client i’s expected payoff contains 
only its own expected loss but does not account for 
client j’s indirect loss. However, under the liability 
contract, client 𝑖 takes full liability for the loss it causes, 
including its own security loss 𝐿 and client j’s indirect 
loss 𝜆𝐿 . Thus, when maximizing its own expected 
payoff, client 𝑖  will try to reduce the likelihood of 
facing severe damage by investing more in its security 
effort. The magnitude of 𝜆𝐿  ensures that client i’s 
increased security effort precisely matches its own 
benchmark effort. 
Next, we analyze the MSSP’s incentive of exerting the 
benchmark effort under the liability contract. As 
evidenced by the proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, as 
the principal, the MSSP’s incentive is always to 
maximize social welfare, no matter what the contract 
type is. Thus, when the liability contract induces 
clients to exert the benchmark efforts, it is optimal for 
the MSSP to also exert its own benchmark effort to 
maximize social welfare. As discussed in Lemma 2, 
?̂?𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡) only when 𝜙𝑖 = 1. Thus, to exert its 
benchmark effort, the MSSP needs to take full 
responsibility for the breach, i.e., the MSSP is 
penalized by (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 for each breach.  
In conclusion, two scenarios occur under the liability 
contract. First, when client 𝑖 is breached and client 𝑗 is 
not, the MSSP is penalized by (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 and client i’s 
penalty is 𝜆𝐿  for the breach. The total penalty (1 +
2𝜆)𝐿 is offered to client 𝑗, and thus client j’s total loss 
is −(1 + 2𝜆)𝐿 + 𝜆𝐿 = −(1 + 𝜆)𝐿 . Thus, client 𝑗  is 
rewarded (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 for suffering an indirect loss while 
keeping itself secure. We find that under the operating 
mechanism of the liability contract, the MSSP 
penalizes the breached client and rewards the 
unbreached client, thereby making the breached client 
“poorer” and the unbreached “richer.” Second, when 
both clients are breached, the MSSP’s penalty is 2(1 +
𝜆)𝐿 for the two breaches, client 𝑖 is penalized by 𝜆𝐿 
for its breach and rewarded by (1 + 2𝜆)𝐿 for suffering 
an indirect loss. The same would be the case for client 
𝑗. As a result, the MSSP pays compensation (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 
to each client when both clients are breached. Table 2 
summarizes the penalties and rewards under all 
scenarios of the liability contract case. 
We now answer the third question. Based on Lemma 
4, we find the new compensation combination ?̃? =
(?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛, ?̃?𝑛𝑏)  under the liability contract is only 
related to the system interdependency and security loss 
and has nothing to do with other parameters. As 
mentioned above, the system interdependency can be 
estimated using data from the past breaches. Thus, 
since it is easy to evaluate the compensation 
combination, the liability contract is easy to 
implement, which is an advantage compared to BRC 
and monitoring contracts.  
5 Comparison of the Three 
Contract Types: Bilateral 
Refund, Monitoring, and 
Liability  
For a deeper comparison of the three contract types, we 
conduct the comparative statics of output sensitivities 
and system interdependency among different contract 
types and identify the optimal contract choices for the 
principals. Table 3 lists the optimal security efforts for 
both the MSSP and the client in the benchmark case 
and the three contractual arrangements.
 
Table 2. Penalties and Rewards under all Scenarios of the Liability Contract Case 













MSSP 0 (1+λ)L (1+λ)L 0 (1+λ)L (1+λ)L 0 2(1+λ)L 2(1+λ)L 
Client 𝑖 L λL (1+λ)L λL -(1+2λ)L -(1+λ)L (1+λ)L -(1+λ)L 0 
Client 𝑗 λL -(1+2λ)L -(1+λ)L L λL (1+λ)L (1+λ)L -(1+λ)L 0 
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Table 3. Contract Comparison 
Contract types The MSSP’s security effort The client’s security effort 
Benchmark case 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡) =




𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶
 
Bilateral refund contract ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1 + 𝜆)(𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 − 𝜆𝛼2)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 + 𝛼2)
 ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼3(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 + 𝛼2)
 
Monitoring contract ?̄?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶 + 𝐶𝑅
 ?̄?𝐹(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶 + 𝐶𝑅
 
Liability contract ?̃?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶
 ?̃?𝐹(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼(1 + 𝜆)(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝐶
 
5.1 Comparative Statics 
This section compares the impact of output sensitivity 
and system interdependency on both parties’ security 
efforts in terms of the three contract types. 
































Proposition 3 shows the differences in how both 
parties’ output sensitivities affect their optimal security 
efforts in terms of the three contract types. Proposition 
3(a) shows that, under the BRC, one party’s security 
effort increases with its own output sensitivity but 
decreases with the other’s, which captures the effort 
interaction between the MSSP and the client under the 
BRC. As the MSSP becomes more productive (i.e., 𝛽 
increases) because of the adoption of new security 
technology, it would want the client firm to outsource 
more security functions to it. The MSSP would thus 








< 0 ), which can be achieved by 
increasing the compensation. Similarly, as the client’s 
output sensitivity increases (i.e., 𝛼  increases), it is 
beneficial for the MSSP to decrease the optimal 
compensation to entice the client to devote more effort 
toward its own security (i.e., 
𝜕?̂?𝐹(𝑡)
𝜕𝛼
> 0) so that the 





However, as stated above, both parties perform their 
respective duties and exert effort in strict accordance 
with their respective output sensitivities under the 
monitoring and liability contracts. As a result, one 
party’s security effort increases with its own output 
sensitivity but has nothing to do with the other party’s 
output sensitivity, as stated in Proposition 3(b). 




< 0 when 𝜆 < 𝜆0
𝜕?̂?𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕𝜆





> 0 when 𝜆 < 𝜆1
𝜕?̂?𝐹(𝑡)
𝜕𝜆




< 0 when 𝜆 < 𝜆1
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝜆













and (b) under the monitoring contract and liability 
contract, both parties’ security efforts increase with 
𝜆. 
One party always faces the trade-off between 
investment risk and security risk when making security 
decisions. Investment risk implies the risk of 
overspending on security, and security risk implies the 
risk of loss from security breaches (Wu et al., 2017). 
Higher system interdependency indicates a higher risk 
of loss faced by the client, which implies that a higher 
security risk is suffered by both parties. Thus, we can 
expect that with higher system interdependency, both 
the MSSP and the client would exert more security 
effort to reduce the security risk. However, Proposition 
4 suggests that this intuition is not always correct under 
the BRC, but it is correct under the monitoring and 
liability contracts. 
We first discuss the BRC. Proposition 4(a) shows that 
the MSSP’s effort is U-shaped in system 
interdependency. Two countervailing effects influence 
the MSSP’s incentive. First, a high investment risk 
caused by increasing effort costs discourages the 
MSSP from investing in security since the MSSP is 
concerned about overspending on security. Second, a 
high-security risk caused by intensified system 
interdependency forces the MSSP to increase its effort 
in order to reduce the probability of a breach and 
ensure that its client can access the reservation utility. 
When system interdependency is low, the MSSP’s 
security risk is relatively lower compared to 
Managing Information Security Outsourcing  
 
838 
investment risk; thus, the MSSP reduces its efforts in 




0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜆 < 𝜆0 ). Conversely, when system 
interdependency becomes high, security risk is 
relatively higher than investment risk. As a result, the 




> 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜆 > 𝜆0). 
Proposition 4(a) also shows that, unlike the MSSP, the 
client’s effort is inverse U-shaped in terms of system 
interdependency. A client’s effort can only improve its 
own security quality and does not affect other clients; 
thus, the client cannot directly reduce its own security 
risk caused by system interdependency. System 
interdependency affects the client’s effort through the 
MSSP’s compensation indirectly, which is also 
verified by the proof of Lemma 2 (i.e., ?̂?𝐹𝑖(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼(1−𝜙𝑖)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶
). To maximize its expected payoff, the 
client increases its effort to reduce expected loss when 
the MSSP decreases compensation and decreases its 
effort to save effort cost when the MSSP increases 
compensation. That is, the client’s effort follows an 
opposite pattern with the compensation. Thus, it is only 
necessary to explore the relationship between the 
compensation coefficient and system interdependency. 
To understand the relationship between the 
compensation coefficient and system interdependency, 
we discuss the role of 𝜆  in three situations:𝜆 ≤ 𝜆0 , 
𝜆0 < 𝜆 ≤ 𝜆1 , and 𝜆 > 𝜆1 . When 𝜆  is at a low level 
(i.e., 𝜆 ≤ 𝜆0), the MSSP faces a low security risk and 
thus decreases its effort, as a result, it is rational for the 
MSSP to decrease compensation to entice the client to 






> 0 when 𝜆 <
𝜆0). When 𝜆 is at a moderate level (i.e., 𝜆0 < 𝜆 ≤ 𝜆1), 
the MSSP begins to increase its effort. In this case, 
both the MSSP’s security risk and investment risk 
increase. To maximize its expected payoff, the MSSP 
will reduce compensation, and the client will respond 







0 when 𝜆0 < 𝜆 < 𝜆1 ). Once 𝜆  becomes high enough 
(i.e., 𝜆 > 𝜆1 ), meaning that the security risk is also 
high enough, to ensure that the clients can access 
reservation utility, the MSSP must increase its effort at 
a faster rate and also increase compensation to make it 
attractive for clients to outsource their security 
functions, which in turn leads to the client decreasing 






< 0 when 𝜆 > 𝜆1).  
Proposition 4(b) indicates that, in contrast to the BRC 
case, both parties’ security efforts increase with system 
interdependency under the monitoring and liability 
contracts. As mentioned above, both parties perform 
their respective duties and exert efforts in strict 
accordance with their respective responsibility under 
the monitoring and liability contracts. This suggests 
that the MSSP will not overspend on security efforts 
and thus will not face investment risk under these 
contracts. Higher system interdependency leads to a 
higher security risk, and thus the MSSP and the client 
must increase their security efforts to decrease the 
security risk. 
Figure 2 shows that Proposition 4(a) results from the 
numerical analysis where 𝛼 = 1.6, 𝛽 = 1, 𝑎 = 0.1, 𝐶 =
10, 𝜀 = 0.1, 𝐿 = 200, 𝑇 = 10, 𝑡 = 5  (The results are 
similar when these values are varied), and 𝜆0 = 0.15, 
𝜆1 = 0.6. Since 𝜙 ∈ (0,1), we magnify ?̂? five times to 
show the three relationships in one figure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Numerical Analysis of Proposition 4(a) 
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5.2 Choices for the Principals 
This section analyzes the fourth question about the two 
new proposed contracts, i.e., Is the proposed contract 
worth implementing for the principal? We answer this 
question by comparing the above three contracts from 
the perspective of information security participants, 
including clients, the CI firm, and the MSSP. This 
analysis can guide practitioners in selecting the most 
beneficial contract while establishing a value co-
creation environment. Since clients are not the 
principal in any of the three contract scenarios, they are 
not involved in choosing contracts and their expected 
payoff is always equal to their reservation utility. We 
now focus on the choice of the principals, i.e., the CI 
firm and the MSSP. 
The CI firm has an incentive to implement the 
monitoring contract only when its expected payoff is 









) − 𝐹𝑅 . We 
offer the following proposition regarding the choices 
of the CI firm: 
Proposition 5: The CI firm has the incentive to 
implement the monitoring contract only if the fixed 
monitoring cost is lower than a certain threshold, 










Proposition 5 indicates that a high monitoring cost 
restrains the CI firm’s motive to implement the 
monitoring contract. Further, 𝐹𝑅0 increases with attack 
probability, system interdependency, and time horizon. 
Thus, we can conclude that high system 
interdependency, a high probability of undirected 
attacks, or a long contract horizon enhances the 
incentive of the CI firm to implement the monitoring 
contract. 
Indeed, the motivation for the CI firm to implement the 
proposed contract should be driven not only by 
achieving savings in monitoring costs through efficient 
use of IT but also by the realization that improving the 
trust between the CI firm and the MSSP (and clients) 
will result in greater acceptance of the monitoring 
contract. Prior literature has treated control and trust as 
a complementary relationship—that is, the more trust 
there is, the less need for control there is, and vice versa 
(Das & Teng, 1998). Thus, when the CI firm and the 
MSSP (and clients) have a high degree of trust based 
on their prior cooperation, the control cost of 
monitoring efforts is reduced, leading to the CI firm 
having a higher incentive to implement the monitoring 
contract. 
We now focus on the choice of the MSSP by 
discussing the fourth question of the liability contract, 
i.e., is it worth implementing the liability contact for 
the MSSP? For the MSSP, there is no difference in 
expected payoff between the BRC and the monitoring 
contract. Thus, we only discuss the MSSP’s choice 
between the BRC and the liability contract. 
An implication of Proposition 2 is that the liability 
contract makes the poorer client even “poorer” and the 
richer client even “richer.” Thus, before signing the 
liability contract, the MSSP should investigate clients’ 
attitudes toward the new contract and entice them to 
accept it. However, if breaches occur, the breached 
client may be reluctant to pay the penalty exacted by 
the MSSP, potentially leading the MSSP to sue the 
client. Therefore, we assume that the MSSP needs to 
expend a fixed implementation cost 𝐶𝑉 to ensure that 
both players will abide by the liability contract. 𝐶𝑉 
may comprise investigation fees, legal fees, and so 
forth. For example, the Cardsystems/Savvis breach 
resulted in a lengthy and expensive legal battle (Zetter, 
2009); MSSPs should seek to avoid such outcomes. 
Proposition 6: The MSSP prefers the liability contract 
over the bilateral refund contract if the fixed 
implementation cost 𝐶𝑉 is lower than a threshold, 




Viewed from the perspective of the MSSP, the liability 
contract dominates the BRC when the implementation 
cost of the liability contract is smaller than the 
threshold 𝐶0. 𝐶0 is the actual gap between the MSSP’s 
expected payoff under the liability contract and that 
under the BRC. Thus, even the fixed implementation 
cost 𝐶𝑉  may not be easy to estimate because of the 
newness of the liability contract, we can explore the 
magnitude of 𝐶0  to help MSSPs choose a better 
contract form. We obtain the following two interesting 
insights through an analysis of the threshold.  
First, 𝐶0  increases with attack probability, system 
interdependency, and time horizon. Thus, we can 
conclude that MSSPs prefer the liability contract over 
the BRC when they face high system interdependency, 
a high probability of undirected attack, or a long 
contract horizon. 
Second, while keeping the total of both parties’ output 
sensitivities as a constant, 𝐶0 first increases and then 
decreases with either party’s output sensitivity. The 
setting that maintains the total of both parties’ output 
sensitivities as a constant and changes one party’s 
output sensitivity can be regarded as a responsibility 
assignment between the MSSP and the client. This 
insight indicates that the MSSP has an incentive to 
choose the liability contract when both parties have 
nearly equal responsibility for improving security 
quality. Proposition 1(a) indicates that both parties 
suffer the worst DMH problem when both parties have 
nearly equal responsibility, and thus the BRC performs 
worst in this case. However, there is no DMH problem 
under the liability contract. Thus, the MSSP would 
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prefer the liability contract over the BRC when both 
parties have nearly equal responsibility for improving 
security quality.  
Finally, we should note that to solve the DMH problem 
under the BRC, the CI firm must undertake monitoring 
costs under the monitoring contract and the MSSP 
must undertake implementation costs under the 
liability contract. Thus, under these two new contract 
types, social welfare will always be lower than that 
under the benchmark case because of the associated 
monitoring and implementation costs. 
6 Extensions 
To generalize the proposed contracts, we further 
extend the analysis of the basic model in two 
directions. First, we allow the MSSP’s security efforts 
to have a spillover effect on the clients. Second, we 
allow the MSSP to serve three or more clients. 
6.1 Spillover Effect of Security Efforts 
Thus far, our model has assumed that an MSSP’s 
security efforts regarding different clients are 
independent of each other. However, an MSSP serving 
multiple clients can enhance its investment 
effectiveness by improving security technologies and 
implementation, thus benefitting all clients (Zhao et al., 
2013). An MSSP’s effort in terms of a particular client 
may have a spillover effect on other clients and this 
beneficial effect is obvious when facing undirected 
attacks since undirected attacks may be more pervasive, 
massive, and easier to address. This section relaxes the 
assumption of independent effort to account for the 
spillover effect. 
Assumption 6: Client i’s instantaneous increase in 
security quality is ?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) +
ℎ𝛽𝑒𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2 , where h  represents the 
spillover effect.  
We omit the analysis and give the following Lemma 
directly: 
Lemma 5: When considering the spillover effect,  










(b) In the bilateral refund contract, the MSSP 
utilizes a compensation coefficient ?̂? =
𝛽2(1+𝜆)2(1+ℎ)2−𝜆𝛼2
𝛽2(1+𝜆)2(1+ℎ)2+𝛼2
, and exerts effort ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1+𝜆)(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2(1+ℎ)2−𝜆𝛼2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2(1+ℎ)2+𝛼2)









, and the client 




(d) Under the liability contract, the compensation 
combination is ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏), where ?̃?𝑏𝑏 =
(1 + 𝜆)𝐿, ?̃?𝑛𝑏 = (1 + 2𝜆)𝐿, and ?̃?𝑏𝑛 = −𝜆𝐿. The 








The underlying insights of Lemma 5 are as follows. 
First, the spillover effect does not affect the client’s 
benchmark effort but improves the MSSP’s benchmark 
effort. This is because we assume that only the MSSP’s 
security effort has a spillover effect on security quality, 
which leads to an increase in security quality, and as a 
result, the MSSP can benefit from the spillover effect. 
Second, both parties’ new BRC efforts are still weaker 
than their own new benchmark efforts; that is, the 
DMH problem still arises under the BRC when 
considering the spillover effect, which is similar to 
Lemma 2. Third, under the monitoring contract, when 
the variable monitoring cost is negligible, both parties’ 
security efforts under the spillover effect can still 
achieve their new respective benchmark efforts and 
solve the DMH problem, similar to Lemma 3. Fourth, 
both the MSSP and the client exert benchmark efforts 
under the liability contract, which means that the 
liability contract still works and can eliminate both 
parties’ DMH problem when considering the spillover 
effect. Moreover, the compensation combination under 
the liability contract remains unchanged when 
considering the spillover effect. The operating 
mechanism of the liability contract forces both parties 
to take full liability for the breaches by penalizing the 
breached client and rewarding the unbreached client. 
Thus the compensation combination relies only on the 
security loss and system interdependency and has 
nothing to do with other factors such as the spillover 
effect. 
6.2 The Case of Three or More Clients 
In this section, we extend the model from two clients 
to three or more clients served by the MSSP. Here we 
focus on the liability contract. We omit analysis of the 
BRC and monitoring contracts for brevity because 
these contract types are similar to the liability contract 
in this case. 
Assume that the MSSP serves 𝑁 clients, where 𝑁 ≥ 3. 
Hackers attack 𝑘 out of 𝑁 clients during the contract 
period where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁. When  the MSSP serves two 
clients, we find that under the liability contract, if client 
𝑖 is breached, the MSSP incurs a penalty of 𝐿 + (𝑁 −
1)𝜆𝐿 for this breach, and client 𝑖 has a penalty of (𝑁 −
1)𝜆𝐿  for this breach since it causes every client 
excluding client 𝑖 to suffer a system interdependency 
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loss. Thus, the total reward for the other 𝑁 − 1 clients 
is 𝐿 + 2(𝑁 − 1)𝜆𝐿, i.e., every client excluding client 𝑖 
obtains a reward 
𝐿+2(𝑁−1)𝜆𝐿
𝑁−1
. Since 𝑘  clients are 




, and the breached clients will be rewarded 
𝑘 − 1 times (client 𝑖 will not be compensated by the 
MSSP when it suffers a breach itself), i.e., every 




As mentioned before, since the breached client 𝑖 has a 
penalty (𝑁 − 1)𝜆𝐿 for its own breach and also obtains 
a reward of (𝑘 − 1)
𝐿+2(𝑁−1)𝜆𝐿
𝑁−1
, client i’s total 




− (𝑁 − 1)𝜆𝐿 =
(𝑘−1)𝐿
𝑁−1
+ (2𝑘 − 𝑁 − 1)𝜆𝐿. 
Proposition 7: Under the liability contract, when the 
MSSP serves 𝑁 clients, if 𝑘 out of the 𝑁 clients are 
breached during the contract period,  
(a) if client 𝑖  is not breached, the MSSP 
compensates client 𝑖 with 𝑘(
𝐿
𝑁−1
+ 2𝜆𝐿);  
(b) if client 𝑖 is breached, the MSSP compensates 
client 𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  
(𝑘−1)𝐿
𝑁−1
+ (2𝑘 − 𝑁 − 1)𝜆𝐿. 
Next, we verify whether efforts under the proposed 
contract can achieve benchmark efforts. Here we 
assume the probability that 𝑘  out of 𝑁  clients are 
breached during the contract horizon is 𝑝𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 −
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   (11) 
 
We find that ?̃?𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡) and ?̃?𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑒𝐹
∗(𝑡) , which 
is established under the contract in Proposition 7. Thus, 
the liability contract can be extended to the case in which 
an MSSP serves three or more clients.  
7 Conclusion 
This paper emphasizes that the management of 
information security outsourcing is usually undertaken 
in a dynamic cooperation environment. We construct a 
differential game framework, in which the task of 
improving security quality depends on the security 
efforts of both an MSSP and its clients; their allocation 
of efforts can change throughout the contract duration. 
Moreover, two distinctive characteristics of security 
outsourcing, hacker behavior and system 
interdependency, complicate the contractual 
arrangement between an MSSP and its clients. 
Considering these facts, we discuss various contractual 
arrangements and compare their performance against 
the benchmark solution, where an MSSP and its clients 
are vertically integrated. 
We first discuss the bilateral refund contract, which is 
a widely adopted contractual type in the MSSP 
industry. We show that the BRC can induce a DMH 
problem since neither the MSSP nor its clients take full 
liability for breaches. We observe that either 
monitoring security efforts or making both parties take 
full liability can solve the DMH problem. Thus, we 
propose two new contract types. One is the monitoring 
contract, in which both the security efforts of the 
MSSP and clients are monitored by a cyberinsurance 
firm. The other is the liability contract, in which both 
parties take full liability for breaches by rewarding 
clients who are well protected and penalizing clients 
who are breached by hackers. We find that the DMH 
problem can be solved only when the variable 
monitoring cost is negligible under the monitoring 
contract, while it is fully solved without any conditions, 
under the liability contract. 
We conduct further analysis by comparing the three 
contracts and find that the cyberinsurance firm has the 
incentive to implement a monitoring contract only when 
the fixed monitoring cost is low. In practice, a low 
monitoring cost can be achieved not only by efficient 
use of IT tools but also by improving the trust between 
the CI firm and the MSSP (and clients). Analogously, 
the liability contract also worth implementing when the 
implementation cost is low. As evidenced by the legal 
battle between Cardsystems and Savvis, implementation 
costs can also involve investigation fees, legal fees, and 
so forth. We find that implementation costs are 
relatively low when the MSSP faces high system 
interdependency or a high probability of undirected 
attack, when the contract horizon is long, or when both 
parties have nearly equal responsibility during the 
contract duration. Also, we should note that the two 
proposed contracts are suitable for security outsourcing 
relationships in which security breaches can be observed 
(e.g., firms in the United States are legally required to 
disclose security breaches to the public) and the liability 
for these breaches cannot be easily assigned to any one 
party (e.g., the CardSystem/Savvis case). 
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This research can be extended in several directions 
based on the limitations identified here. First, beyond  
undirected attacks, strategic attacks in which hackers 
choose their efforts according to the quality of the 
system’s security quality would be a fruitful topic for 
future research. Second, the CI firm may have an 
incentive to deny that either party’s security effort has 
reached the required level in the monitoring contract 
case, and clients may have incentives to attack other 
clients when it is the sole victim of a breach under the 
liability contract. Issues related to incentives for the CI 
firm and clients to commit fraud could also be 
examined. Finally, instead of hiring a CI firm to 
monitor both parties, the MSSP and clients can 
monitor and verify each other’s security efforts by 
proposing an alternative contract that includes the 
mandatory sharing of their security efforts as an 
additional contract term. Future research could explore 
whether such an alternative contract would perform 
better than the monitoring contract. 
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Proof of Lemma 2 
The proof of Lemma 1 is an abbreviated version of that of Lemma 2. Hence, we omit the details of Lemma 1’s proof 
for brevity, and only prove Lemma 2. In the bilateral refund contract (BRC), anticipating how both parties will 
determine their best response in effort, the MSSP solves the following problem in Stage 1: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓1,𝜙1,𝑓2,𝜙2
 𝑈𝑀(?̂?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̂?𝐹2(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀2(𝑡))                                              (A1) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.  ?̂?𝐹𝑖(𝑡) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
 𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2            (A2) 
 (?̂?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀2(𝑡)) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑒𝑀1(𝑡),𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))
 𝑈𝑀(?̂?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̂?𝐹2(𝑡), 𝑒𝑀1(𝑡), 𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))                 (A3) 
 𝑈𝐹𝑖(?̂?𝐹𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀𝑖(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)) ≥  ?̱?𝐹 , 𝑖 = 1,2                               (A4) 
 𝑈𝑀(?̂?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̂?𝐹2(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̂?𝑀2(𝑡)) ≥  2?̱?𝑀                                                            (A5) 
 ?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2                                                (A6) 
 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2                                                                           (A7) 
The MSSP’s objective is to maximize its own expected payoff by choosing two decision variables, 𝑓 and 𝜙. Note that 
the MSSP needs to decide two pair-wise contract terms since the number of clients, 𝑁 = 2. Here, the state variable 𝑞𝑖 
is the security quality of client 𝑖, and control variables 𝑒𝑀𝑖 and 𝑒𝐹𝑖 represent the MSSP’s and client i’s effort levels, 
respectively. Constraints represented as equations (A2) and (A3) are client i’s and the MSSP’s incentive compatibility 
constraints, respectively. Constraints represented as equations (A4) and (A5) are both parties’ individual rationality 
constraints. Constraints represented as equations (A6) and (A7) are the same as Equations (3) and (4) in Section 3.1. 
We first use Pontryagin’s maximum principle to drive the open-loop Nash equilibrium efforts in Stage 2 of the game. 










2 (𝑡) + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) +
𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)) + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2, where 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2. Here 𝜆𝑀𝑖 , 𝜆𝐹𝑖 , and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖  
are shadow prices, we can interpret the six shadow prices as the marginal benefit of security quality at time 𝑡. 𝜆𝑀𝑖, 𝜆𝐹𝑖 , 
and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖  are given by:?̇?𝑀𝑖 = −
𝜕𝐻𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑡)
= −𝑎𝐿(𝜙𝑖 + 𝜆𝜙3−𝑖), ?̇?𝐹𝑖 = −
𝜕𝐻𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑡)




−𝜆𝑎𝐿(1 − 𝜙𝑖) . Solving these differential equations with the boundary conditions 𝜆𝑀𝑖(𝑇) = 0,  𝜆𝐹𝑖(𝑇) = 0,  and 
𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑇) = 0 , we have 𝜆𝑀𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎𝐿(𝜙𝑖 + 𝜆𝜙3−𝑖)(𝑇 − 𝑡) , 𝜆𝐹𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎𝐿(1 − 𝜙𝑖)(𝑇 − 𝑡) , and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑎𝐿(1 −
𝜙𝑖)(𝑇 − 𝑡). 
After substituting 𝜆𝑀𝑖, 𝜆𝐹𝑖 , and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖  into the two Hamiltonian functions and getting the derivatives of the two functions 
with respect to the control variables 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) to be zero, we have:𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(𝜙𝑖 + 𝜆𝜙3−𝑖)(𝑇 − 𝑡) − 𝐶𝑒𝑀𝑖 = 0 and 
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼(1 − 𝜙𝑖)(𝑇 − 𝑡) − 𝐶𝑒𝐹𝑖 = 0. Solving the two equations we can obtain the open-loop Nash equilibrium efforts 






. Since the Hamiltonian functions are 
strictly concave, the second-order conditions for this differential game are also satisfied. 
Now, we have obtained the open-loop Nash equilibrium efforts with Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Previous 
research  has proven that if the Pontryagin type necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash equilibrium do not depend 
on the state variables, then the open-loop Nash equilibrium is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium (Fershtman, 
1987). Thus, both parties’ equilibrium efforts are degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium solutions since effort 
trajectories do not dependent on the state variable 𝑞(𝑡) . The feedback Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect by 
construction (Selten, 1975); thus, we can conclude that both parties’ equilibrium efforts in Stage 2 are the subgame-
perfect equilibrium, which can provide credible and efficient threats since no players can benefit from deviating from 
its announced strategy (Sorger, 1989). 
With the subgame-perfect equilibrium, we now solve the two contract terms in Stage 1. We first solve the state variable 








𝑡2) + 𝑞0. Next, since the MSSP acts as the principal, the MSSP has no 
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incentive to leave both clients any value more than their reservation utilities. Thus, the MSSP makes both firms’ 







− ?̱?𝐹 . 
Finally, after substituting the service fee 𝑓𝑖, the state variable security quality 𝑞𝑖(𝑡), the MSSP’s effort 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡), and 
clients’ efforts 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) into the objective of the MSSP, we have  
(?̂?1, ?̂?2) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝜙1,𝜙2)





















}2𝑖=1 − 2?̱?𝐹. 
Note that, the above function can be written as (?̂?1, ?̂?2) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑀 (⋅) = 𝑆𝑊(⋅) − 2?̱?𝐹 , where 𝑆𝑊(⋅) is the 
summation of the expected payoffs of the MSSP and both clients. Thus, the MSSP’s incentive in stage 1 is to choose 
an optimal compensation to maximize the total expected payoffs of both parties. Since clients’ reservation utilities are 
constants, the MSSP’s objective is always to maximize social welfare. Taking the integrals and get the first-order 
condition with respect to 𝜙1  and 𝜙2 , we get the following equation:𝛽
2𝜆2𝜙𝑖 + 𝛼
2𝜆 + 𝛼2𝜙𝑖 − 𝛽
2𝜆2 + 2𝛽2𝜆𝜙3−𝑖 −
2𝛽2𝜆 + 𝛽2𝜙𝑖 − 𝛽
2 = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2. Since both clients are homogeneous, we focus on the symmetric case. Solving the 
equations, we obtain ?̂? =
𝛽2(1+𝜆)2−𝜆𝛼2
𝛽2(1+𝜆)2+𝛼2
. Substituting ?̂? into the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the MSSP and clients, 
we have ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼3(1+𝜆)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2+𝛼2)
 and ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1+𝜆)(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2−𝜆𝛼2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2+𝛼2)
.  Since 𝑒𝐹(𝑡) ≥ 0 and 𝑒𝑀(𝑡) ≥ 0, we have 
the following condition satisfies: 𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 ≥ 𝜆𝛼2. Substituting ?̂?, ?̂?𝑀(𝑡), and ?̂?𝐹(𝑡) into the service fee equation, 
we can obtain the service fee:  






. Substituting 𝑓 , ?̂? , ?̂?𝑀(𝑡) , 
?̂?𝐹(𝑡) into (5) in Section 4.1, the MSSP’s expected payoff under the BRC is obtained: ?̂?𝑀 = 2𝑉(𝑇) − 2𝑎𝐿𝑇(1 +
𝜆)(1 − 𝑞0) +
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2𝑇3(1+𝜆)2(𝛽4(1+𝜆)2+𝛼4+𝛼2𝛽2)
3𝐶(𝛽2(1+𝜆)2+𝛼2)
− 2?̱?𝐹 . 
Hence, Lemma 2 is proven. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Proposition 1(a): 
𝜕(𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡) − ?̂?𝑀(𝑡))
𝜕𝛽
= −
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛼2(1 + 𝜆)2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 − 𝛼2)(𝑇 − 𝑡)












≤ 0 when 𝛽 ≥
𝛼
1+𝜆
. Thus, we can conclude that 𝛽 first worsens 





𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)3(𝛽2(1 + 𝜆)2 − 𝛼2)(𝑇 − 𝑡)









≤ 0 when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛽(1 + 𝜆). Thus, we can conclude that 𝛼 first 






























Proof of Lemma 3 
The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to that of Lemma 2, and we only give a short proof here. Under the monitoring 
contract, the CI firm faces the following payoff maximization problem in Stage 1:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼𝐹,𝐼𝑀,𝑠𝐹,𝑠𝑀
𝑈𝑅 = 2𝐼𝐹 − 2𝐼𝑀 + (𝑠𝑀 − 𝑠𝐹) ∑ {∫ {𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿}𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0




2 (𝑡) + 𝑒𝐹𝑖
2 (𝑡))𝑑𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖
𝑇
0
}2𝑖=1       (A8) 
 𝑠. 𝑡. (?̄?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̄?𝐹2(𝑡), ?̄?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̄?𝑀2(𝑡)) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑒𝐹1(𝑡),𝑒𝐹2(𝑡),𝑒𝑀1(𝑡),𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))
 𝑈𝑅                                                       (A9) 
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 𝑈𝑀 = 2𝐼𝑀 − 𝑠𝑀 ∑ {∫ {𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿}𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0







}2𝑖=1 ≥ ?̂?𝑀                        (A10) 










≥ ?̱?𝐹 , 𝑖 = 1,2                    (A11) 
 ?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2                                                                                  (A12) 
 𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2                                                                                                             (A13) 
where 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2. The CI firm’s objective in equation (A8) is to maximize its own expected payoff, 
in which 2𝐼𝐹 − 2𝐼𝑀 represents the insurance premium charged from clients and the service fee paid to the MSSP, 
(𝑠𝑀 − 𝑠𝐹) ∑ {∫ {𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿}𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
}2𝑖=1  represents the CI firm’s penalty to the MSSP and the compensation to clients 




2 (𝑡) + 𝑒𝐹𝑖
2 (𝑡))𝑑𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖
𝑇
0
}2𝑖=1  represents the CI firm’s fixed and variable 
monitoring costs. The constraint in equation  (A9) is the CI firm’s incentive compatibility constraint. Constraints in 
equations (A10) and (A11) are the MSSP’s and client i’s  individual rationality (IR) constraints, respectively. The term 
𝑠𝑀 ∑ {∫ {𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿}𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
}2𝑖=1  in the MSSP’s IR constraint represents the CI firm’s penalty imposed on the MSSP, 
and the term 𝑠𝐹 ∑ {∫ {𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿}𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
}2𝑖=1  in the client i’s IR constraint represents the CI firm’s compensation to 
clients when a breach occurs. 
As the principal, the CI firm will always set the insurance premium and the compensation such that the expected 
payoffs of clients are indifferent between their reservation utilities and taking the security contract. To attract the MSSP 
to use cyberinsurance, the CI firm needs to ensure that the MSSP’s benefit under the monitoring contract is no less 
than that under the BRC. Thus, the CI firm will set the service fee and the penalty such that the expected profit of the 
MSSP is indifferent between that under the BRC and that under the monitoring contract.  
Thus, after combining the expected payoffs of three parties, the Cyber-insurance Firm’s problem in the second stage 
becomes 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝐹1,,𝑒𝐹2,𝑒𝑀1,𝑒𝑀2
 𝑈𝑅 = −?̂?𝑀 − 2?̱?𝐹 − ∑ {∫ 𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(1 + 𝜆)𝐿𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0










2 (𝑡))} 𝑑𝑡 − 𝐹𝑅𝑖}. Solving the above problem, we have ?̄?𝑀(𝑡) =
𝜀𝑎𝐿𝛽(1+𝜆)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝐶+𝐶𝑅




both parties’ security efforts into their respective expected payoffs, we can obtain the relationship between the 
insurance premium (service fee) and the compensation (penalty).  
Proof of Lemma 4 
Under the liability contract, the MSSP solves the following problem in Stage 1 of the game: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑓1,𝐷1,𝑓2,𝐷2
 𝑈𝑀(?̃?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹2(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀2(𝑡))      (A14) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  ?̃?𝐹𝑖(𝑡) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
 𝑈𝐹𝑖(𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2   (A15) 
(?̃?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀2(𝑡)) ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
(𝑒𝑀1(𝑡),𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))
 𝑈𝑀(?̃?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹2(𝑡), 𝑒𝑀1(𝑡), 𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))                  (A16) 
𝑈𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝐹𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)) ≥  ?̱?𝐹 , 𝑖 = 1,2                                 (A17) 
𝑈𝑀(?̃?𝐹1(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹2(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀1(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀2(𝑡)) ≥  2?̱?𝑀                                                              (A18) 
?̇?𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖 = 1,2                                                              (A19) 
𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2                                                                            (A20) 
All the above equations and constraints are similar to those given for the BRC case and available in the proof in Lemma 
2, and hence we omit the details for brevity. As the principal, the MSSP will always propose a service fee such that 
clients are indifferent between their reservation utilities and taking the security contract. Thus, with the help of the 
service fee, the MSSP extracts all surplus from the collaboration, leaving clients only their reservation utilities. That 
means, no matter what the proposed compensation is, the MSSP’s incentive in Stage 1 is always to choose an optimal 
compensation to maximize the total expected payoffs of both parties. Since clients’ reservation utilities are constants, 
the MSSP’s objective is to maximize social welfare, as discussed in the Proof of Lemma 2.  
Specifically, in our liability contract, the service fee will be 𝑓 = 𝑈𝐹𝑖(0, ?̃?, ?̃?) − ?̱?𝐹. 𝑈𝐹𝑖(0, ?̃?, ?̃?) is client i’s expected 
payoff given that the service fee proposed by the MSSP is zero, the compensation combination is ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏) , 
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and both players’ equilibrium security efforts are ?̃? = (?̃?𝐹𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀𝑖(𝑡), ?̃?𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡)) . Thus, the MSSP’s 
expected payoff is 𝑈𝑀 = 𝑈𝑀(0, ?̃?, ?̃?) + 2𝑓 − 𝐶𝑉 = 𝑈𝑀(⋅) + 𝑈𝐹𝑖(⋅) + 𝑈𝐹𝑗(⋅) − 2?̱?𝐹 − 𝐶𝑉 = 𝑆𝑊(⋅) − 2?̱?𝐹 − 𝐶𝑉 . 
Since both ?̱?𝐹 and 𝐶𝑉 are constants, the MSSP’s objective is to maximize 𝑆𝑊(⋅). Therefore, if possible, the MSSP will 
propose any ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏) that can reach the benchmark efforts. Our next focus is to find ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏) so 
that ?̃?𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑒𝐹
∗(𝑡) and ?̃?𝑀(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑀
∗ (𝑡). 
The Hamiltonian functions for the MSSP and clients under the liability contract are given by: 
𝐻𝑀(𝑡) = {





2 (𝑡) + 𝑒𝑀2
2 (𝑡)) + 𝜆𝑀1𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹1(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀1(𝑡)) + 𝜆𝑀2𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹2(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀2(𝑡))
} and 
𝐻𝐹𝑖(𝑡) = {





2 (𝑡) + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹𝑖(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡)) + 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖𝜀(𝛼𝑒𝐹(3−𝑖)(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑒𝑀(3−𝑖)(𝑡))
} , where 
𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑎(1 − 𝑞𝑖(𝑡)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1,2. 
The shadow prices 𝜆𝑀𝑖 , 𝜆𝐹𝑖 , and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖  are given by: ?̇?𝑀𝑖 = −
𝜕𝐻𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕𝑞𝑖(𝑡)
= 2𝑎𝑝3−𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑏) − 𝑎(𝑑𝑏𝑛 +
𝑑𝑛𝑏) ,and ?̇?𝐹𝑖𝑖 = −
𝜕𝐻𝐹𝑖(𝑡)
𝜕𝑞3−𝑖(𝑡)
= 𝑎𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛 − 𝑑𝑛𝑏) + 𝑎(𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝜆𝐿) . Solving these differential equations with 
boundary conditions 𝜆𝑀𝑖(𝑇) = 0, 𝜆𝐹𝑖(𝑇) = 0, and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑇) = 0, we have𝜆𝑀𝑖(𝑡) = −(2𝑎𝑝3−𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑏) +
𝑎(𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛𝑏))(𝑇 − 𝑡), 𝜆𝐹𝑖(𝑡) = (𝑎𝑝3−𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑏) + 𝑎(𝐿 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛))(𝑇 − 𝑡),  and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡) = (𝑎𝑝𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑛 +
𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑏) + 𝑎(𝜆𝐿 − 𝑑𝑛𝑏))(𝑇 − 𝑡). 
After substituting 𝜆𝑀𝑖, 𝜆𝐹𝑖 , and 𝜆𝐹𝑖𝑖  into the two Hamiltonian functions and getting the derivatives of the two functions 
with respect to the control variables to be zero, we have:−𝜀𝛽(𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑎[2𝑎(1 − 𝑞3−𝑖(𝑡))(𝑑𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛 − 𝑑𝑛𝑏) + 𝑑𝑏𝑛 +
𝑑𝑛𝑏](𝑇 − 𝑡) − 𝐶𝑒𝑀𝑖(𝑡) = 0  and 𝜀𝛼[𝑎
2𝑞3−𝑖(𝑡)(𝑑𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛 − 𝑑𝑛𝑏) + 𝑎(𝐿 − 𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑏 + 𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛)](𝑇 − 𝑡) −








 Since the Hamiltonian functions are strictly concave, the second-order conditions for this differential game are also 
satisfied.  
The only 𝐷 = (𝑑𝑏𝑏 , 𝑑𝑏𝑛 , 𝑑𝑛𝑏)  that can make the efforts under the liability contract equals the benchmark efforts 
regardless of the value of 𝑞3−𝑖(𝑡) satisfies the following three equations: 𝑑𝑏𝑏 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛 − 𝑑𝑛𝑏 = 0, 𝑑𝑏𝑛 + 𝑑𝑛𝑏 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿, 
and 𝐿 − 𝑑𝑏𝑛 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿. The solutions are 𝑑𝑏𝑏 = (1 + 𝜆)𝐿 , 𝑑𝑛𝑏 = (1 + 2𝜆)𝐿, 𝑑𝑏𝑛 = −𝜆𝐿.  








. Substituting ?̃? =
(?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛, ?̃?𝑛𝑏), ?̃?𝐹(𝑡), and ?̃?𝑀(𝑡) into the service fee equation, we can obtain the service fee under the liability contract: 







= 𝑉(𝑇) − ?̱?𝐹 −
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2(1+𝜆)2𝑇3𝛼2
6𝐶
. Substituting 𝑓 , ?̃? = (?̃?𝑏𝑏 , ?̃?𝑏𝑛 , ?̃?𝑛𝑏) , ?̃?𝐹(𝑡) , and 
?̃?𝑀(𝑡)  into (7) in Section 4.3, the MSSP’s expected payoff under the liability contract is obtained:𝑈𝑀 = 2𝑉(𝑇) −
2𝑎𝐿𝑇(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝑞0) +
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2𝑇3(1+𝜆)2(𝛼2+𝛽2)
3𝐶
− 2?̱?𝐹 − 𝐶𝑉. 
Hence, Lemma 4 is proven. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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, since 3𝑥 − 2√2𝑥 > 0 (𝑥 = 1 + 𝜆)  is 
always established when 𝑥 ≥ 1, we have 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜆







































It is easy to prove that under the monitoring contract and liability contract, 
𝜕𝑒𝑀(𝑡)
𝜕𝜆




Proof of Proposition 6: 
According to Lemma 2, the MSSP’s expected payoff under the BRC is 




According to Lemma 4, the MSSP’s expected payoff under the liability contract is 
𝑈𝑀 = 2𝑉(𝑇) − 2𝑎𝐿𝑇(1 + 𝜆)(1 − 𝑞0) +
𝜀2𝑎2𝐿2𝑇3(1+𝜆)2(𝛼2+𝛽2)
3𝐶
− 2?̱?𝐹 − 𝐶𝑉. 
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